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THE PROCESS OF CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION: A SYNTHESIS OF THE
PRESENT AND A GUIDE TO THE FUTURE
William A. Kaplin*
I. INTRODUCTION
In late twentieth century America, we are again witness to an
escalating and often discomforting debate about the interpreta-
tion of our Constitution.' This debate, in its origins as old as the
Constitution itself, has gained new impetus from social and politi-
cal developments of recent years. Such reawakening and the re-
sulting concerted emphasis on the interpretive process is, of
course, entirely appropriate. Interpretation, after all, goes to the
heart of the matter. It is through the process of interpretation
that we give meaning and therefore life to the Constitution. And
by giving life to the Constitution through interpretation, we de-
termine who we are as a people governed by it.
The current debate, however, is not without its downside. As it
has lifted study of the interpretive process to new levels of so-
phistication, this debate about a public document belonging to us
all is becoming the exclusive province of academic experts. Com-
mentators from law, philosophy, and other disciplines propose
new theories and approaches for developing constitutional mean-
© Copyright 1990 by William A. Kaplin. All rights reserved.
* Professor of Law, Catholic University of America. This article is an outgrowth of a
paper presented by the author as part of a public lecture program entitled "Philosophy
and the U.S. Constitution" held in Fall 1987 and sponsored by the School of Philosophy,
The Catholic University of America. The author thanks his law faculty colleagues Roger
Hartley and William Wagner, who commented on both the earlier paper and later versions
of this Article, others who participated in a "work-in-progress" seminar on the earlier pa-
per, and research assistant Douglas Snyder.
1. For some of the leading recent contributions, see M. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE
COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS (1982); R. DWORKIN, LAW's EMPIRE (1986) (especially ch. 9);
1787: The Constitution in Perspective, 29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1 (1987) (symposium);
Interpretation Symposium, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 279 (1985); P. BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL
FATE (1982); J.H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980); M.
TUSHNET, RED, WHITE & BLUE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1988); Con-
stitutional Adjudication and Democratic Theory, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 259 (1981) (sympo-
sium); Tribe, On Reading the Constitution, 1988 UTAH L. REV. 747. For an overview of the
interpretive process, see W. MURPHY, J. FLEMING & W. HARRIS, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION (1986).
RUTGERS LAW REVIEW
ing through interpretation, other commentators critique these
proposals, and yet other commentators (or the original proposers)
critique the critiques. As the debate has progressed, it has become
increasingly abstract and esoteric as commentators sometimes ad-
dress themselves only to other well-versed academics. The differ-
ences and contradictions among theories have become magnified,
while the common ground is sometimes lost in the shuffle. Theo-
ries have too often been insufficiently related to practice. Atten-
tion has focused too much on the theoretical conundrums that
inhibit progress, and too little on suggestions for incremental
steps that might be taken to further understand or improve the
interpretive process.
This Article provides a counterbalance to these trends in the
constitutional interpretation debate. First, the Article is ad-
dressed not only to academic experts but also to practicing law-
yers, law students, government officials, and academics who are
interested but not expert in the process of constitutional interpre-
tation. Second, the Article emphasizes the common ground or
agreement about interpretation as much as the disagreements,
and offers a synthesis of the interpretive process that charts the
common ground and models the best of current understanding.
Third, the Article relates theory to practice by exploring the
ramifications of this synthesis for courts, other interpreters, and
those making or critiquing constitutional arguments in practice.2
Fourth, the Article suggests specific steps that we might take,
building on the synthesis, to further our understanding of and im-
prove the functioning of the process of constitutional
interpretation.
To accomplish these goals, the Article proceeds largely by con-
structing a descriptive theory that provides an account of the in-
terpretive process as it actually exists in practice and an account
of the disagreements that have developed concerning this process.
In addition, the Article includes some normative theory prescrib-
ing how the interpretive process should function in areas where
2. In so doing, this Article indirectly addresses the "commensurability" or "coherency"
problem that is often attributed to constitutional law-that is, the problem arising from
an absence of any cohesive plan for interrelating the various types of constitutional law
arguments or the various parts of the interpretive process. See, e.g., Fallon, A Constructiv-
ist Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 100 HARV. L. REv. 1189 (1987). In
its descriptive aspects, this Article suggests that the commensurability problem is not as
great as sometimes asserted; in its prescriptive aspects, this Article suggests ways to better
fit the pieces together to alleviate the problem that does exist.
[Vol. 42:983
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
there is considerable doubt and disagreement about its workings,
or where the apparent practice, in the author's view, is misguided
or underdeveloped. In these areas, the Article seeks to select,
from among the plausible descriptive theories, the one that
"guides future conduct in the most normatively attractive way."3
II. WHO INTERPRETS THE CONSTITUTION, AND How?
The process of constitutional interpretation, as developed in
this Article, is the process by which "official interpreters"4 apply
the Constitution to, and thereby resolve, particular problems re-
garding the scope and allocation of governmental power and the
rights of individuals. There are two foundational questions to ask
about this process: who are the official interpreters of the Consti-
tution, and how do these interpreters undertake to interpret the
Constitution? This Article places more emphasis on the second
question, which is implicated to a greater degree in the concerns
expressed in the Introduction. It will be apparent that the two
questions are interrelated, and that exploration of the second
("how") question must at points intersect consideration of the
first ("who") question.'
A. Who Interprets the Constitution?
Regarding the first foundational question, it is clear that the
federal and state courts are not the only official interpreters of
the Constitution. The Constitution's empowerment provisions are
addressed to all three branches of government that are empow-
ered, not just the judicial branch. The Constitution's individual
rights provisions are addressed to all policy-making agencies and
officials of government-federal, state, and local-that are lim-
3. Fallon, supra note 2, at 1233; see generally id. at 1231-37 (discussing the intertwining
of descriptive and normative theory).
4. "Official interpreters" are those governmental branches, agencies, and officers who,
as part of their official responsibilities, interpret the Constitution in the course of address-
ing particular matters that come before them. Compare infra note 10 (definition of "unof-
ficial interpreters"). Official interpreters may be part of an "interpretive community,"
Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REV. 739, 744-47 (1982), but it is an "in-
siders" community, cf. Brest, Interpretation and Interest, 34 STAN. L. REV. 765, 770-71
(1982), that differs from the "outsiders" interpretive communities, discussed infra note 10,
that participate in unofficial interpretation.
5. For points of intersection, see infra text accompanying note 22, Parts VI(3)-(5), infra.
For general discussion of the interrelationship between the two questions, see P. BREST,
PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING 1-2, 9-10 (1st ed. 1975).
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ited by these provisions. Moreover, the Constitution itself re-
quires the President,6 the members of Congress, the members of
the state legislatures, the state governors, and all other executive
officials of the federal and state governments to take an oath to
support the Constitution.7 Since all are bound to uphold the Con-
stitution, all are responsible for interpreting it insofar as constitu-
tional questions arise in the course of their official duties. In this
sense, members of the United States Congress may be considered
official constitutional interpreters,8 as may the President, heads
of cabinet departments, members of a state legislature, and the
governor of a state.' By extension, other officers or agencies that
exercise delegated federal or state governmental power-such as
members of a city council or commissioners of a federal or state
administrative agency-may also be considered official constitu-
tional interpreters.0 .0
Although it has become increasingly clear since the famous
1803 case of Marbury v. Madison" that the United States Su-
preme Court is, for most purposes, the Constitution's ultimate in-
6. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 8.
7. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3.
8. See Mikva, How Well Does Congress Support and Defend the Constitution?, 61 N.C.
L. REV. 587 (1983); Fisher, Constitutional Interpretation by Members of Congress, 63 N.C.
L. REV. 707 (1985).
9. P. BREST, supra note 5, at 15-30, 44-46, presents an illuminating case study of the
U.S. Senate acting as a constitutional interpreter in deciding whether to confirm President
Nixon's nomination of Senator William Saxbe for Attorney General. For a case study con-
cerning the debate on the chartering of the First Bank of the United States implicating
the Congress, the President, and heads of cabinet departments as constitutional interpret-
ers, see P. BREST & S. LEVINSON, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING 10-18 (2d
ed. 1983). For other historical examples, see W. ANDREWS, COORDINATE MAGISTRATES: CON-
STITUTIONAL LAW BY CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT (1969). See generally J.W. HURST,
DEALING WITH STATUTES 67-78 (1982).
10. In contrast to "official interpreters," there are also "unofficial interpreters" of the
Constitution. They are the practitioners and commentators-private individuals who have
no governmental authority to interpret the Constitution but whose work influences the
official interpretation by the force of its reasoning and the weight of its supporting re-
search. Practicing lawyers commonly fulfill this role. Equally important, law professors,
philosophers, historians, political scientists, social scientists, and members of other aca-
demic disciplines may be unofficial interpreters. Moreover, each generation of citizens, in-
dividually or collectively in "interpretive communities," may also influence the official in-
terpretation. For a discussion of interpretive communities, see Cover, Foreword: Nomos
and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1983). See also McDougall, Social Movements, Law,
and Public Policy: A Clinical Dimension for the New Legal Process (to be published in 75
CORNELL L. REV.) (discussing the "interpretive community" and the related concept of the
"implementive community").
11. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
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terpreter, this judicial role does not eclipse the interpretive roles
of other government officials and bodies. They remain responsible
for interpreting the Constitution, as applied to their own activi-
ties and decisions, until such time as the courts have spoken on
the issues that arise. Such judicial pronouncements may not occur
until years after an issue first arises because of the considerable
financial costs and strategic difficulties of sustaining litigation.
Occasionally such judicial pronouncements will not occur at all,
due to judicial invocations of non-justiciability.' 2 When matters
generated by the actions of governmental officials and bodies do
come before the courts, the official or body involved is responsi-
ble for presenting a constitutional interpretation to the court,
which is entitled to due respect."3 Even when courts have previ-
ously ruled on matters that arise from the activities of govern-
ment officials or bodies, the latter still have a role to play. The
court's decision may establish guidelines that leave sensitive in-
terpretive judgments to legislators or others whose activities were
at issue." Additionally, if officials or bodies disagree with the
court's interpretation, they may seek to raise the issue again, pre-
sent the basis for their contrary interpretation, and urge judicial
reconsideration. 5
B. How Is the Constitution Interpreted?
The second foundational question about the interpretive pro-
cess concerns how the Constitution is interpreted. Since the late
1950's, and especially in the 1980's, the writings of scholars and
jurists have expanded the list of theories responding to this ques-
tion.'6 What in earlier times was a debate about strict versus lib-
eral construction of the Constitution, or judicial restraint versus
12. See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 3-7 to 3-9, 3-13 to 3-17
(2d ed. 1988).
13. See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 703 (1974) ("In the performance of
assigned constitutional duties each branch of the Government must initially interpret the
Constitution, and the interpretation of its powers by any branch is due great respect from
the others.").
14. See Brest, The Conscientious Legislator's Guide to Constitutional Interpretation,
27 STAN. L. REV. 585 (1975).
15. Carter, The Courts Are Not the Constitution, Wall St. J., Feb. 7, 1989, at A24, col.
4.
16. The most influential among the earlier writings include Wechsler, Toward Neutral
Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959); Black, The Bill of Rights, 35
N.Y.U. L. REV. 865 (1960); and A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962). For ex-
amples of writings in the 1980's, see supra note 1.
1990]
RUTGERS LAW REVIEW
judicial activism, has given way to a more helpful and sophisti-
cated debate about "originalism" versus "nonoriginalism" or "in-
terpretivism" versus "noninterpretivism."
'17
The purpose of this Article is not to review all of this commen-
tary, which is far too voluminous, or to critique the work of any
particular theorist. Rather, this Article will briefly survey the the-
oretical debate, assess where matters stand on the "how" ques-
tion, and fashion a perspective that may help us move from the-
ory to practice and from present to future. In so doing, particular
attention will be given to the pervasive problem of value judg-
ment in constitutional interpretation. To pursue these purposes,
the "how" question will be restated as follows: What are, and
should be, the sources for constitutional interpretation; and what
are, and should be, the interpretive approaches that emerge from
these sources?
III. SOURCES OF CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
In law, as in other disciplines concerned with interpretation,
sources of interpretation may be classified as either primary or
secondary. Primary sources in law are the root sources-the origi-
nal raw material from which all interpretation derives. Each such
source must stake its own claim to legitimacy based on the au-
thoritativeness of the material and interpretive approaches it en-
compasses. Secondary sources in law are those derived from the
primary sources; their legitimacy depends on the authoritative-
ness of the primary sources on which they are based.
In studying constitutional interpretation it is helpful to main-
tain this distinction between primary and secondary sources, al-
though not all commentators do so.18 There are only four sources
that plausibly qualify as primary sources for constitutional inter-
'17. Regarding the distinction between originalism and nonoriginalism, see Brest, The
Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U.L. REV. 204, 229, 237 (1980);
Perry, The Authority of Text, Tradition, and Reason: A Theory of Constitutional Inter-
pretation, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 551, 601-02 (1985). Regarding the distinction between inter-
pretivism and noninterpretivism, see Brest, supra, at 223-24, 231-34; M. PERRY, supra note
1, at 10-11; Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV. 703, 703-05
(1975); Simon, The Authority of the Constitution and Its Meaning: A Preface to a The-
ory of Constitutional Interpretation, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 603, 619-20 (1985).
18. See, e.g., P. BOBBirT, supra note 1; W. MURPHY, J. FLEMING & W. HARRIS, supra note
1; Fallon, supra note 2 (each of which treats together various constitutional arguments
based on primary and secondary sources).
[Vol. 42:983988
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preters to consult. These four sources are constitutional text, 9
original constitutional history, the inferences to be drawn from
the overall structure of the Constitution, and the values that are
embedded in or reflected in the Constitution ("constitutional val-
ues"). The major secondary source is precedent that is derived
over time from the four primary sources.20 The most accessible
and most utilized body of precedent, of course, is that which
courts develop on a case-by-case basis and adhere to under the
doctrine of stare decisis. 21 Precedent, however, may also be devel-
oped by other constitutional interpreters. The Congress may cre-
ate precedent, for example, when it accepts or rejects a bill provi-
sion or amendment partly on the basis of documented
constitutional issues. A President may create precedent when ve-
toing a bill for constitutional reasons. An Attorney General may
create precedent when issuing an opinion resolving constitutional
issues. Even without such formal documentation, the consistent
practices of other government branches concerning their powers
may form a type of precedent. In The Steel Seizure Case, Justice
Frankfurter emphasized the precedential force of such practices:
"[A] systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to
the knowledge of the Congress and never before questioned, en-
gaged in by Presidents who have also sworn to uphold the Consti-
tution, making as it were such exercise of power part of the struc-
ture of our government, may be treated as a gloss on 'executive
Power ... ."'22
Though authoritative and more frequently cited than primary
19. In a broad sense, the text is always the source of constitutional interpretation, since
interpreters are almost always seeking to give meaning to a particular portion of the text.
In the narrower sense used here, however, text is a source only insofar as meaning is dis-
cernible from the text language itself rather than from the history, structure, or value
system surrounding the language.
20. Precedent as a secondary source may serve many important purposes in constitu-
tional argument. It is the source of holdings of "cases on point" and analogous cases-the
hard law whose discovery is a joyous occasion for groping law students and harried practi-
tioners. It is also a source of more abstract concepts and principles of law, of information
on the institutional considerations that shape a particular interpreter's role and compe-
tence within the constitutional system, and of information on which adjudicative and
"constitutional" facts are relevant to particular constitutional issues. Moreover, precedent
is a critical source of information as to which primary interpretive sources and approaches
are most suitable for particular constitutional clauses.
21. See generally Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571 (1987).
22. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610-11 (1952) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring). See generally Glennon, The Use of Custom in Resolving Separation of
Powers Disputes, 64 B.UL. REV. 109, 127-47 (1984).
1990]
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sources, precedent as a secondary source has no legitimacy inde-
pendent of the primary sources themselves.23 Hence, the primary
sources provide the focal point for this Article.
Although most commentators would acknowledge the legiti-
macy of the first three interpretive sources (text, history, struc-
ture), and many would acknowledge the legitimacy of the fourth
(values), there is neither a consensus on how to describe and
package the range of interpretive sources,2 ' nor a uniform under-
standing of the appropriate use of these sources. Just as there are
strict and liberal textualists, for instance, there are strict and
moderate originalists; and there are values interpreters who
would substantially confine the circumstances in and means by
which they identify values as well as those who would engage in
wide-ranging explorations of moral goodness. Nevertheless, each
of the four sources identified above is represented in opinions of
the United States Supreme Court and is reflected in the growth
of constitutional law. Each also has its strong supporters among
the commentators on constitutional interpretation. Moreover,
each can be differentiated from the others and be seen to comple-
ment the others in terms of their roles and methodologies. Taken
together, then, these four sources provide an appropriate basis for
a model of constitutional interpretation.
IV. APPROACHES TO CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
From the four primary sources of constitutional interpretation
emerge four interpretive approaches or methodologies for deriving
meaning from the Constitution: the textual approach, the histori-
cal approach, the structural approach, and the values approach.
These four approaches, in turn, provide the basis for four generic
23. This position has ramifications, of course, for the issue of when judicial precedent
may be overruled. The central problem is this: Suppose a contemporary court determines
that a long-standing precedent, upon reexamination, is not supported by the primary in-
terpretive sources; should the court therefore overrule the precedent, or should it allow the
precedent to stand because an overruling would be too disruptive of settled expectations?
In the abstract, the position on primary and secondary sources would support the overrul-
ing alternative, but an analysis of the four interpretive approaches, infra Parts IV-V, sug-
gests that the conditions for overruling long-standing precedent would rarely exist in the
real world. See infra Part V(9).
24. See P. BOBBIT, supra note 1; W. MURPHY, J. FLEMING & W. HARRIS, supra note 1;
Fallon, supra note 2. See also M. TUSHNET, supra note 1. But see P. BREST, supra note 5,
at 2, 7 (identifying the same four interpretive sources discussed in this Article and using
then as the organizational structure for Part I of the book).
[Vol. 42:983
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types of constitutional argument: arguments from text, arguments
from history, arguments from structure, and arguments from
values.2"
A. Textual Approach
The first approach, textual interpretation, has its source in the
written text of the Constitution. The focus is on the language it-
self, not on the intentions of the Drafters that may lurk behind
the language, and the search is for the meaning that words convey
to a reader unfamiliar with the Drafters' intentions.2 The prom-
ise of the textual approach lies in the common core of meaning
that particular usages of particular words and phrases may con-
vey. At least some words and phrases, it is argued, are sufficiently
clear that almost everyone would agree on their meaning in at
least some of their applications. Common examples include the
numerical phrases in the Constitution, such as the clause specify-
ing that a person must be at least thirty-five years of age to be
eligible for the Presidency. 7 Other words and phrases, although
less clear, nevertheless convey sufficient sense to narrow the
range of possible meanings they could have in concrete situations;
thus, to a lesser extent and in varying degrees, such language also
constrains the interpreter. One recent prominent example is the
word "person" in the fourteenth amendment, which the Supreme
Court, using a textual approach, has construed to exclude the
unborn. 8
A number of questions immediately arise concerning this inter-
pretive approach. 9 For instance, the meaning of words can
change over time; thus the meaning attributed to a particular
word at the time the constitutional provision was drafted may
25. These generic forms of constitutional argument may be supported with secondary as
well as primary sources. The secondary source of precedent, for example, may provide the
most concrete evidence of the import of text language, the lessons of history, the infer-
ences drawn from structures, and the values that are rooted in the Constitution. For other
types of argument that supplement these four generic types, see Fallon, supra note 2, at
1204-09, 1262-68; Lyons, Derivability, Defensibility, and the Justification of Judicial De-
cisions, 68 MONIST 325, 330-32 (1985).
26. Bennett, Objectivity in Constitutional Law, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 445, 457-60 (1984).
27. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5.
28. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 156-59 (1973).




differ from the meaning attributed to that word today." Should
the words of the written Constitution be understood according to
the original meaning that drafters or readers of the late eight-
eenth century gave them, or according to the meaning that a con-
temporary reader would give them?3 1 Moreover, some words may
have technical as well as common sense meanings, or literal as
well as figurative meanings. Ready examples of the former in-
clude the phrase "privileges and immunities" in article IV and
the fourteenth amendment, 2 the word "speech" in the first
amendment, 3 and the word "jury" in the sixth amendment. 4 Ex-
amples of the latter include the word "necessary" in the necessary
and proper clause, 35 the word "papers" in the fourth amend-;
ment,3 6 the phrase "life and limb" in the fifth amendment's
double jeopardy clause, 7 the word "writings" in the copyright
clause, 8 and the word "coin" in the clause authorizing Congress
to "coin money."39 For constitutional words that arguably share
such double meanings, which meaning is to be attributed to
them? Similarly, if context must be considered in order to import
meaning into certain words or phrases, what is the appropriate
context in which to understand constitutional words-that of the
drafters, the members of the legal and governmental community,
or the reasonable person within the surrounding community of
understanding?40
Even if we satisfactorily answer questions such as these, there
30. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 n.8 (1970) (the word "property" in the fifth
and fourteenth amendments); Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 206 (1919) ("incomes" in
the sixteenth amendment). Cf. Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 609-13
(1987) ("race" in the fifteenth amendment).
31. Compare Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 63 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)
(quoting Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 220 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting)) (A consti-
tutional amendment "should be read in a 'sense most obvious to the common understand-
ing at the time of its adoption'. . . . For it was for public adoption that it was proposed.")
with Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350-53 (1967) (holding that FBI phone tapping
constituted a "search and seizure" within the meaning of the fourth amendment).
32. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1; amend. XIV, § 1.
33. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
34. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
35. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. See also McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.)
316, 413-15 (1819). According to Chief Justice Marshall, "nothing is more common than to
use words in a figurative sense." Id. at 414.
36. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
37. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
38. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
39. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 5.
40. See supra text accompanying note 31.
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are still evident limitations to the textual approach, recognition of
which would counsel against reliance on language alone to solve
most constitutional problems. Much language in legal documents,
and certainly in the Constitution, is a product of compromise that
may reflect or leave room for varying viewpoints. There may be
no common viewpoint and no single meaning embodied in partic-
ular words or phrases chosen by the Drafters. Moreover, drafters
of language (and certainly the Drafters of the Constitution) may
have worked with highly imperfect concepts and highly complex
ideas. Such concepts and ideas often cannot be captured precisely
in words. It may thus be unrealistic to expect that the-Constitu-
tion's language can reveal all the contours or content of the con-
cepts and ideas being expressed.
For these reasons and others, commentators often refer to the
inherent "indeterminacy" of language, suggesting that words have
varying degrees of "open texture" within which meaning may be
indeterminate or must be ascertained by resort to sources other
than the language.," Chief Justice Marshall included an early rec-
ognition of this phenomenon in McCulloch v. Maryland when he
stated: "Such is the character of human language, that no word
conveys to the mind, in all situations, one single definite idea.""2
This problem of indeterminancy or open texture is exacerbated in
the Constitution because so much of the language is used to forge
general principles regarding rights and powers rather than spe-
cific rules for the solution of concrete problems. In this sense, the
Drafters may have made deliberate use of the open texture of lan-
guage, using words with no precise and fixed meaning, so as to
allow future interpreters a range of discretion in attributing spe-
cific meanings to words in unforeseen circumstances. The Consti-
tution's due process clauses, for example, can be said to reflect
such purposive vagueness, as can the equal protection clause, the
cruel and unusual punishment clause, and other human rights
clauses.
Certainly in situations calling for interpretation of open-tex-
tured clauses, and often in interpreting more specific clauses, we
cannot derive answers to concrete problems solely by reference to
language. We must look to other sources.
41. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 121-27 (1961).




The second approach to constitutional interpretation, the his-
torical approach, uses original history as its source. This approach
focuses on the concept of "Framers' intent," the presumed key
(along with text) to the "original understanding" of the Constitu-
tion's provisions. The historical interpreter searches for this origi-
nal understanding and seeks to follow it in resolving contempo-
rary problems. Under the narrower version of this approach, the
interpreter's task is to resolve a particular dispute in the same
way that the "Framers" resolved it or would have resolved it had
the dispute come before them during their debates. Under the
broader version, the task is to discover the principles that the
Framers used or would have used to resolve a particular type of
dispute, or would have wanted interpreters to use if such a dis-
pute were to arise in the future.4"
There are three historical periods within which the interpreter
searches for original understanding: the period of the fra'ming of
the original Constitution, the period of the framing of the Bill of
Rights, and the period of the framing of the post-Civil War
amendments (the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth amend-
ments). In each period the focus is on what the Framers did, said,
and thought, gleaned not only from records of the drafting, adop-
tion, and ratification processes, but also from the relevant histori-
cal context.
Contemplation of this historical approach reveals substantial
theoretical problems and substantial limits on its usefulness.44
The threshold question is this: Why should the Framers' inten-
tions, apart from those embodied in the text itself, be authorita-
tive in constitutional interpretation? If the Framers accepted ra-
cial segregation or gender discrimination or capital punishment,
for example, why should we be bound by their views? The People
43. For examples of such uses of history by the United States Supreme Court, and de-
bate on whether the narrower or broader version of historical interpretation should apply,
see Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983) (holding that the Nebraska legislature's chap-
laincy practice does not violate the establishment clause); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78,
86-103 (1970) (holding that the sixth amendment guarantee of trial by jury does not re-
quire that membership be fixed at twelve). See also id. at 122-29 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
44. See R. DWORKIN, supra note 1, at ch. 9; Lyons, Constitutional Interpretation and
Original Meaning, 4 Soc. PHIL. & POL'Y 75, 77-82 (1986); S. MACEDO, THE NEW RIGHT V.
THE CONSTITUTION 5-19 (1986); Dworkin, The Forum of Principle, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 469,
476-97 (1981); Simon, The Authority of the Framers of the Constitution: Can Originalist
Interpretation be Justified?, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1482 (1985); Brest, supra note 17.
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who adopted the Constitution adopted only the written text, not
any separate intentions of the Framers. This text does not tell us
that later generations are to be bound by the Framers' intent, nor
is there even a "Framers' intent" that later generations must fol-
low the Framers' intent.4 5 Why then, should later generations be
bound? Is it because such a rule inevitably conduces to the public
good? Is it because such a rule is a reliable and revealing key to
discovering meaning? Any such claims must take account of the
fact that the various framer groups were not representative cross-
sections of American society then or now. The Framers did not
include blacks, other minorities, women, or unpropertied persons.
Any such claims must also account for the fact that the Framers
could not have envisioned many of the intervening developments
that have shaped the country from 1787 until now and provided
the context in which current interpretive problems arise. As Jus-
tice Oliver Wendell Holmes remarked, "[w]hen we are dealing
with words that also are a constituent act, like the Constitution of
the United States, we must realize that they have called into life
a being the development of which could not have been foreseen
completely by the most gifted of its begetters.""'
From the threshold question of authoritativeness, other ques-
tions about the historical approach follow. First in order, who
were the Framers? The question must be asked separately for
each of the three historical periods. For the original Constitution,
for instance, were the Framers those who actually drafted the lan-
guage? Or all those who signed the document in Philadelphia? Or
all delegates who attended at least some sessions of the Conven-
tion? Or did the Framers also include the delegates to the state
ratifying conventions whose actions made the Constitution, the
law of the land? Most commentators, and apparently the United
States Supreme Court, now acknowledge that the Framers in-
clude not only those who participated in the drafting and ap-
proval process but also those who participated in the ratifying
conventions."7 The theoretical and practical difficulties involved
in the search for Framers' intent increase with this broadened
45. See Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885
(1985). But see Rotunda, Original Intent, the View of the Framers, and the Role of Ra-
tifiers, 41 VAND. L. REV. 507 (1988); Lofgren, The Original Understanding of Original In-
tent?, 5 CONST. COMMENTARY 77 (1988).
46. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920).
47. See, e.g., Rotunda, supra note 45.
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definition of the group.
The next question is whether the Framers had a collective state
of mind capable of ascertainment, either as to the general princi-
ples underlying constitutional provisions or as to specific rules for
resolving particular problems. If there was no collective state of
mind, or if it cannot be perceived from our late twentieth century
perspective, then the Framers' intent as a source for interpreta-
tion is elusive at best, misleading and fruitless at worst. It is said
that the debates and decisions of deliberative bodies such as the
Constitutional Convention are so influenced by political compro-
mise and inconsistent mixtures of principle and expedience, so
subject to unexpressed intentions and purposive vagueness, that
no collective state of mind can be discerned for many matters of
enduring importance. 8 Moreover, once the Ratifiers are included
in the group whose collective mind is sought, the search becomes
even more complicated-not only because there were separate
conventions in each of the states but also because the official pro-
ceedings of the Constitutional Convention were sketchy, unrelia-
ble, and were not transmitted to the state ratifying conventions. 9
There was thus no official mechanism for informing these state
conventions of the Drafters' intentions.
The next question concerns documentation. If there is a collec-
tive state of mind that is theoretically ascertainable, then some
reliable historical record must be found or reliably reconstructed
before Framers' intent can meaningfully guide interpretation. On
this point, commentators have argued that the historical record is
sparse and often less than enlightening-especially if the Ra-
tifiers are included among the Framers." As Justice Jackson re-
48. See generally Dworkin, The Forum of Principle, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 469, 476, 482-88
(1981). But see F. McDONALD, Novus ORDO SECULORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE
CONSTITUTION chs. I, VI (1985).
49. The Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia was conducted in secret sessions. No
system of press coverage or other external monitoring of the convention existed. 1 THE
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 xi (M. Farrand ed. 1937) [hereinafter THE
RECORDS]. Indeed, the delegates to the convention did not give any extended attention to
the maintenance of official records of their debates, motions, and votes. As a result, some
votes on motions were recorded without statement of the question being voted upon, and
some of the debates were missing. Id. at xiii. There is no indication that these incomplete
official records of the convention were sent to the individual state ratifying conventions.
See 1 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION 349-75 (J. Elliot ed. 1836) [hereinafter THE DEBATES].
50. See generally THE RECORDS, supra note 49, at xi-xiv; 1 THE DEBATES, supra note 49,
at v-vii. Regarding the Bill of Rights, the U.S. House of Representatives did keep official
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marked, "Ujust what our forefathers did envision, or would have
envisioned had they foreseen modern conditions, must be divined
from materials almost as enigmatic as the dreams Joseph was
called upon to interpret for Pharoah."5
Last is the question of generality or abstraction. In a situation
where there is a collective state of mind for which we have or can
reconstruct a reliable historical account, the interpreter must de-
termine the level of generality or abstraction on which to address
and apply the historical data.2 Suppose the data can be read to
suggest two different Framers' intents on a particular sub-
ject-one specific and concrete, grounded in the realities of the
Framers' own time period, the other more general and abstract,
looking toward yet unknown future realities. Which intent should
guide constitutional interpretation? Suppose, for example, an in-
terpreter is considering the constitutionality of the practice of
opening legislative sessions with a prayer by a chaplain. Should
the interpreter rely on the specific historical data suggesting that
the Framers of the first amendment religion clauses, accepted this
practice? Or should the interpreter glean from history the broad
underlying purposes that the Framers may have attributed to the
clauses-purposes that may be undercut by current practices of
legislative prayer?"3
Such choices between levels of abstraction themselves create
difficult interpretive problems with no easy answers. Even if one
can determine a basis for choosing between the specific and the
general, either choice presents further problems. If one declines to
generalize, using history only to find specific answers to specific
problems that the Framers resolved or envisioned, little or no
guidance will be available for most contemporary constitutional
issues. If one generalizes, there must be some basis for determin-
records of the votes, rhotions, and debates. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 660-77 (J. Gales ed. 1789).
The U.S. Senate, however, kept no official records of the Bill of Rights because the Senate
met behind closed doors until February 20, 1794, the first Session of the Third Congress. 3
ANNALS OF CONG. 48057 (1791). See also R. BERNSTEIN, ARE WE TO BE A NATION? 264-67
(1987); Huston, The Creation of the Constitution: The Integrity of the Documentary Rec-
ord, 65 TEx. L. REV. 1 (1986).
51. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
52. See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 2, at 1198-99, 1215-17; Bennett, supra note 26, at 461-
72; Dworkin, supra note 48, at 469, 488-97.
53. Compare the Burger majority opinion with the Brennan dissent in Marsh v. Cham-
bers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983); compare also the Hughes majority opinion with the Sutherland
dissent in Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
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ing a stopping point. Does the history of the fourteenth amend-
ment equal protection clause, for example, indicate the presump-
tive invalidity of discrimination against blacks only, or of all race
discrimination, or also of all race-like discrimination? If the lat-
ter, how race-like must the discrimination be in order to be
invalid?
These conceptual and practical difficulties with the historical
approach do not completely undermine its role in interpretation;
however, they do suggest that the interpreter must be most cir-
cumspect in considering when and how to use history. Original
history may be helpful for some constitutional problems but not
for others. 4 Even for those problems where history may be help-
ful, its role should be far more modest than is sometimes
claimed.5 Finally, it should be used in conjunction with text,
structure, and values,56 rather than as an end in itself.
C. Structural Approach
The third approach to interpretation is the structural ap-
proach, the source of which is the overall governmental structure
that the Constitution establishes.5 7 The focus is on the document
as a whole rather than on any particular word or phrase. The key
is to identify and understand constitutional mechanisms and rela-
tionships and the political principles that underlie them. The in-
terpreter then draws inferences from that structure-inferences
about how particular constitutional problems should be resolved
in order to maintain the integrity of the structure or uphold the
political principles upon which the structure is based. The struc-
tural approach, therefore, requires the interpreter to work with
the concepts of federalism and separation of powers and with po-
litical principles regarding representative democracy and
constitutionalism.
The classic illustration of the structural approach is Chief Jus-
tice Marshall's 1819 opinion in McCulloch v. Maryland,55 which
54. See infra Part V(5).
55. See infra Part V(2).
56. See infra Part V(6).
57. See, e.g., C. BLACK, STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1969)
(which apparently rekindled scholarly interest in structural interpretation). For a review
of this book and the structural approach, see Blasi, Creativity and Legitimacy in Consti-
tutional Law, 80 YALE L.J. 176 (1970).
58. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
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relied on inferences drawn from both the federal/state structure
of the Constitution and the separation of powers relationship be-
tween Congress and the Supreme Court to uphold Congress' in-
corporation of the Bank of the United States59 and invalidate
Maryland's tax on the bank.6 0 In modern times, a leading use of
structural interpretation has been in cases concerning state power
to regulate interstate trade, where the Supreme Court has in-
ferred that our nation is a single economic unit in which "the peo-
ples of the several states must sink or swim together."61 Although
courts have used structural interpretation primarily to resolve
power questions such as these, some commentators have also used
it to resolve human rights questions.6 2
As with textual and historical interpretation, there are substan-
tial limitations to the use of the structural approach. Different
interpreters may have different understandings of the very same
mechanism or relationship. Underlying principles may be unclear,
or competing principles which speak to the same issue may exist.
Thus, for some problems there may be a range of possible infer-
ences that can be drawn from structure. For other problems there
may be no sound inference to be drawn, since structural arrange-
ments do not sufficiently address the matter. Such potential for
conflicting or inadequate viewpoints exists, as does a potential for
manipulation, because the structural approach requires the inter-
preter to work at a relatively high level of abstraction. As with
the textual and historical approaches, interpreters will often be
unable to rely on the structural approach alone to solve constitu-
tional problems.
D. Values Approach
The fourth approach to constitutional interpretation is the val-
ues approach, the source for which I will cautiously call "constitu-
tional values." Others have called this approach the "fundamen-
59. Id. at 400-24.
60. Id. at 424-36.
61. Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 523 (1935). For examples of other uses
of structural interpretation, see notes 99-100 and accompanying text.
62. See C. BLACK, supra note 57, at 33-66. For judicial uses of structural interpretation
to resolve human rights issues, see Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35, 43-49 (1867)
(right to freely travel from state to state); United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 753-60
(1966) (right to use state facilities, freely engage in interstate commerce, and enjoy pri-
vately owned places of public accommodation).
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tal rights" approach,63 or the "ethics" approach,64 or in its
broadest manifestation, the "noninterpretivist" approach. How-
ever labeled, this approach has been used primarily for individual
rights problems; it has been in ascendancy since the 1954 decision
in Brown v. Board of Education" outlawing de jure racial segre-
gation in public education, and it reached a zenith in 1973 in Roe
v. Wade67 invalidating statutes broadly regulating the availability
of abortions.
The values approach entails a search for the Constitution's ele-
mental principles and the values they serve. Once identified, such
basic values can be used as guides, or "reference points" for inter-
pretation. The interpreter then resolves the problem in a manner
that will uphold the identified value as against other values or
interests that may be at stake.
The values approach is premised on a candid acknowledgment
that the Constitution is a product of value judgments and that
constitutional interpretation consequently requires resort to val-
ues. As one commentator has concluded, "[]ust as the Constitu-
tion cannot be value-free, so our understanding of it must be in-
formed by reflection on the principles it serves."" The
Constitution's preamble itself provides strong support for this no-
tion. It sets out goals that embody values-for example, to "se-
cure the Blessings of Liberty""-and makes clear that fulfillment
of these goals and promotion of these values is the Constitution's
task. Likewise, numerous constitutional provisions following the
preamble are express invocations of values-for example, the pro-
hibition on "cruel and unusual punishments. 70
63. Brest, The Fundamental Rights Controversy: The Essential Contradictions of Nor-
mative Constitutional Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1063 (1981). See also Ely, The Supreme
Court, 1977 Term-Foreword: On Discovering Fundamental Values, 92 HARV. L. REv. 5
(1978).
64. Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate, 58 TEx. L. REv. 695, 726-51 (1980).
65. M. PERRY, supra note 1; Grey, supra note 17.
66. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
67. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
68. Lyons, supra note 44, at 101. See generally Lyons, Substance, Process, and Out-
come in Constitutional Theory, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 745, 751-56 (1987).
69. The Preamble to the U.S. Constitution reads:
We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union,
establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence,
promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves
and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United
States of America.
70. U.S. CoNsT. amend. VIII. See, e.g., infra note 87 and accompanying text.
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In considering the values approach, two threshold questions
arise: What kind of values qualify for use as reference points?
And where may the interpreter search for these values? How one
views the legitimacy and utility of this approach will depend in
large part on the answers to these questions.
Regarding the first question, this much is clear: the eligible val-
ues must be public values; personal or other private values do not
count. They must be national values; regional or state or interest
group values do not count. They must be real values based on the
shared cultural and political experience of our people; artificial
constructs or abstractions do not count. They must be enduring
or "reflectively held" values;7" mere transitory or popular values
do not count.
72
The second question-where may the interpreter search for
such values-occasions a variety of answers. Certainly the text,
original history, and structure of the Constitution are an appro-
priate and useful focus of the search. The text of the first amend-
ment, for example, expressly recognizes values of freedom of ex-
pression and freedom of religion, and by implication a value of
freedom of association;7" the text of the fourteenth amendment
expressly recognizes a value of equality under law. In such situa-
tions, however, the text establishes only a guidepost; it does not
map out the contours of the terrain. In some circumstances, origi-
71. Brest, supra note 63, at 1107.
72. As with the historical approach, there is an ongoing debate about the generality with
which a value is stated. See supra text accompanying notes 52-53. In Bowers v. Hardwick,
478 U.S. 186 (1986), for example, the Court considered the constitutionality of Georgia's
criminal sodomy statute as applied to consensual homosexual sodomy. Justice White, for
the majority, stated that the privacy value at stake concerned only the "right to engage in
homosexual sodomy." Id. at 191. Justice Blackmun, in dissent, rejected this view and ar-
gued that the privacy value at stake concerned the "interest all individuals have in con-
trolling the nature of their intimate associations with others." Id. at 206. Similarly, in
Michael H. v. Gerald D., 109 S. Ct. 2333 (1989), the Court considered the constitutionality
of a California paternity statute as applied to a man claiming to be the natural father of a
child born while the mother was married to another man. Justice Scalia, for a plurality,
stated that the privacy value at stake concerned only a natural father's "parental rights
over a child born into a woman's existing marriage with another man." Id. at 2343. Justice
Brennan, in dissent, rejected this view and argued that the value at stake concerned "a
parent and child in their relationship with each other." Id. at 2352. Justice Scalia sug-
gested a methodology for determining the level of generality that would sharply limit the
degree of generalization. Id. at 2344 n.6. Only one Justice expressly endorsed this sugges-
tion. See id. at 2346-47 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part); id. at 2347 (Stevens, J., concur-
ring in judgment); id. at 2349-55 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 2360 (White, J.,
dissenting).
73. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 960-61 (1958).
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nal history may enhance our understanding of these textual val-
ues. The fourteenth amendment's history, for example, helps us
understand the equality value in the context of ractal subjugation.
Further, structure may provide insight into values apart from
text. Structural inference, for instance, is the source of a personal
mobility value (freedom of travel), 7  and a value of participation
in representative government.75 In effect, the interpreter gathers
evidence from all these sources and weaves it together to develop
a value assessment in each particular case.
In other circumstances, the reliance on text, original history,
and structure as the source of values is less direct, or the reliance
is on a source external to the Constitution. Some commentators,
for instance, have argued that the Declaration of Independence is
a source of values that inform constitutional interpretation 6.7 In a
broader vein, it has been argued that the Constitution arises from
a "set of philosophic presuppositions" that are the source of con-
stitutional principles and ideals.77 Similarly, it has been suggested
that "implicit background assumptions against which the Consti-
tution was drafted" provide a source of values.78 Another com-
mentator has argued that values may be derived from "the en-
tirety of our history," as it reveals "ideas in motion" and from
which we extract "elements of experience and strains of thought
that appear most relevatt to our own time. ' 79 Finally, it has been
74. Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35, 43-49 (1868); United States v. Guest, 383
U.S. 745, 753-60 (1966).
75. J.H. ELY, supra note 1, at 73-79.
76. See, e.g., G. JACOBSOHN, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE DECLINE OF CONSTITUTIONAL
ASPIRATION 102-05, 108-10 (1986).
77. Id. at 75. See also J. ARTHUR, THE UNFINISHED CONSTITUTION: PHILOSOPHY AND CON-
STITUTIONAL PRACTICE (1989), which emphasizes the historical and contemporary competi-
tion between the Federalist and the Republican political philosophies, both of which are
presented as "conceptions of government" giving rise to commitments and ideals that in-
fluence constitutional interpretation. The author apparently treats these two conceptions
of government as distinct interpretive approaches in and of themselves; the better view,
however, is that they are sources of values that are used as reference points under the
values approach to interpretation.
78. Epstein, Foreword to S. MACEDO, supra note 44, at xiv. Freedom to travel among the
states may be one example of such an implicit background assumption. See United States
v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757-58 (1966). Privacy of the marital relationship may be another
example, as Justice Douglas may have considered when he stated in Griswold v. Connecti-
cut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965): "We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights
. ... For evidence of an express background assumption, see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2,
which apparently assumes the existence of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and
thus merely prohibits its suspension.
79. Sandalow, Constitutional Interpretation, 79 MICH. L. REV. 1033, 1070-71 (1981).
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argued that values arise from a "variety of philosophical and reli-
gious systems of moral thought and belief"-a source of values
acknowledged as "extra-constitutional" in nature.80  Among
judges, probably the most-quoted on this point is the second Jus-
tice Harlan, who identified tradition as the source of values, spe-
cifically "the traditions from which [this country] developed as
well as the traditions from which it broke."81
When the evidence of a link between the value and the Consti-
tution is weak, especially when the claim is that the value source
is wholly unconnected to the Constitution, the values approach
generates controversy of major proportions. The argument goes
like this: The only values we can uphold are those the Framers
constitutionalized themselves. We cannot expand their values or
add new values never conceived by them. Thus any approach re-
lying on values not clearly found in text, original history, or struc-
ture is illegitimate.
There is, however, another side to the argument. The text of
the Constitution itself, it is argued, anticipates the later develop-
ment and refinement of values reflected in constitutional text,
history, and structure, and perhaps even the identification of new
values consistent with those reflected. The ninth amendment, for
example, states that "the enumeration in the Constitution, of cer-
tain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others re-
tained by the people," thus suggesting the existence of rights be-
yond those stated in the text.82 The fourteenth amendment
provides that "[n]o state shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States," 83 but does not state what those "privileges" and
"immunities" are. The Constitution's preamble lists the establish-
ment of "justice" and the securing of "blessings of liberty" among
the Constitution's goals-both appeal, it might be said, to broad
enduring values to be developed by later interpreters.
80. M. PERRY, supra note 1, at 109; see also M. PERRY, MORALITY, POLITICS & LAW: A
BICENTENNIAL ESSAY (1988).
81. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). For vigorous debate
on the role of tradition in elucidating "liberty" values, see Michael H. v. Gerald D., 109 S.
Ct. 2333, 2341-46 (1989) (Scalia, J.) (plurality opinion) and id. at 2349-55 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (1989).
82. U.S. CONST. amend. IX. See generally Symposium on Interpreting the Ninth
Amendment, 64 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1 (1988); Commentary on the Symposium on Inter-
preting the Ninth Amendment, 64 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 981 (1988).
83. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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Moreover, the language of many individual rights
clauses-especially the clauses protecting freedom of speech and
press, free exercise of religion, due process of law, equal protec-
tion of the laws, and freedom from cruel and unusual punish-
ments-can be read to leave much developmental work to future
generations.8 4 These so-called "open-textured" or "open-ended"
clauses-termed "invitational" clauses in this Article-document
values and invite later interpreters to develop them by making
more refined value judgments over time in particular circum-
stances. The Supreme Court, from time to time, has forthrightly
acknowledged the developmental role played by these invitational
clauses. Speaking of equal protection and due process, for exam-
ple, the Court emphasized that:
In determining what lines are unconstitutionally discriminatory
we have never been confined to historic notions of equality, any
more than we have restricted due process to a fixed catalogue of
what was at a given time deemed to be the limits of fundamen-
tal rights.8 5
Addressing the cruel and unusual punishment clause, and consti-
tutional rights generally, the Court stated:
Time works changes, brings into existence new conditions and
purposes. Therefore a principle to be vital must be capable of
wider application than the mischief which gave it birth. This is
peculiarly true of constitutions. They are not ephemeral enact-
ments, designed to meet passing occasions. They are, to use the
words of Chief Justice Marshall, "designed to approach immor-
tality as nearly as human institutions can approach it." The fu-
ture is their care and provision for events of good and bad ten-
dencies of which no prophecy can be made. 6
Again, speaking of the cruel and unusual punishment clause, the
Court remarked:
Moreover, the Eighth Amendment's proscriptions are not lim-
ited to those practices condemned by the common law in
1789 .... Not bound by the sparing humanitarian concessions
of our forebears, the Amendment also recognizes the "evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing soci-
84. See, e.g., R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 132-37 (1977).
85. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 669 (1966) (citing Malloy v. Ho-
gan, 378 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1963)).
86. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910) (citation not provided).
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ety." In addition to considering the barbarous methods generally
outlawed in the 18th century, therefore, this Court takes into
account objective evidence of contemporary values before deter-
mining whether a particular punishment comports with the fun-
damental human dignity that the Amendment protects.
87
And speaking of due process, the Court said:
"Liberty" and "property" are broad and majestic terms. They
are among the "[g]reat [constitutional] concepts . . . purposely
left to gather meaning from experience .. .. [T]hey relate to
the whole domain of social and economic fact, and the states-
men who founded this Nation knew too well that only a stag-
nant society remains unchanged."8
Under this latter view of constitutional values, the "Constitu-
tion is not stuffed but pregnant with meaning," and it is left to
interpreters to give birth to that meaning and conscientiously
nurture it over time.
8 9
Aside from such theoretical arguments, there is also a very
practical question about the values approach that is especially
pertinent to individual rights cases: Can individual rights under
the Constitution, as we know them, be further supported and de-
veloped without resort to a values approach? Some commentators
have answered this question in the negative.90 The case of Brown
v. Board of Education"1 is often used as the classic illustration.
The result in this case, it is argued, is not evident from the text of
the equal protection clause, the history of the clause's adoption,
or the constitutional structure; instead, the Court developed the
equality value by making a value judgment about racial segrega-
tion in public education-a judgment different from the four-
teenth amendment Framers' judgment concerning the amend-
ment's immediate effect.9 2 Similar arguments have been made to
explain many of the Supreme Court's opinions on gender discrim-
ination, freedom of speech and press, and the right to privacy.
9 3 If
87. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 406 (1986) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86,
101 (1958) (plurality opinion)) (other citations omitted).
88. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571 (1972) (quoting National Ins. Co. v.
Tidewater Co., 337 U.S. 582, 646 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)).
89. C. CURTIS, LIONS UNDER THE THRONE 8 (1947). See generally infra Part V(4).
90. See, e.g., M. PERRY, supra note 1, at 61-45; Grey, supra note 17, at 710-14.
91. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
92. See, e.g., Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69
HARV. L. REv. 1, 59 (1955).
93. See, e.g., Grey, supra note 17, at 711-13; see generally M. PERRY, supra note 1; J.W.
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these arguments are correct, then the absence of a values ap-
proach would make our future constitutional law much different
from what it is today.
V. TENTATIVE CONCLUSIONS ABOUT THE CONSTITUTIONAL INTER-
PRETATION PROCESS
Based on the above characterizations of interpretive sources
and approaches, what conclusions might be drawn about the pro-
cess of constitutional interpretation? Among the varieties of ap-
proaches and contending arguments, we need to find the common
ground, fit together the pieces of this puzzle as best we can, and
better relate theory to practice.
These are the conclusions:
1. Of all the interpretive approaches, the textual approach has
the least disputed claim to legitimacy. The text is the only in-
tepretive source that was presented to the various ratifying bodies
for approval and the only source that was adopted. Most constitu-
tional issues implicate one or more specific clauses of the text;
thus text usually provides the authoritative starting point, and
continuing reference point, for interpretation. The text is also a
controlling source for interpretation; no other source may be used
to contradict it. But the enlightenment gained from the text will
vary from clause to clause and problem to problem, and in most
situations the text itself will not resolve the issue being ad-
dressed. In cases that count, therefore, the text must be used in
conjunction with one or more other interpretive sources.
2. The historical approach is fraught with theoretical and prac-
tical problems that challenge its legitimacy. Yet the courts, and
many commentators, continue to ascribe some interpretive role to
this approach. If refined and limited in response to the useful cri-
tiques that have been made,94 the historical approach can retain a
plausible claim to legitimacy within a narrowed range of opera-
tion and expectation.
For instance, many of the historical approach's difficulties can
be ameliorated by adopting more modest and less dispositive
objectives. Occasionally a search of original history, in conjunc-
tion with text, may provide an answer to a specific constitutional
HURST, DEALING WITH STATUTES 99-106 (1982).
94. See, e.g., the critiques cited supra note 44.
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question concerning a practice steeped in history. 5 In most cir-
cumstances, however, if history speaks at all to an issue, it is in a
different way. History may be searched, in conjunction with other
sources, not for specific answers but for a reflection of principles
that may have undergirded the Framers' delibera-
tions-principles of enduring vitality that provide guidelines for
later interpreters but do not bind them to the Framers' reactions
to the particular issues of the times."' It would therefore be inap-
propriate, in most circumstances, to argue that the Framers
prejudged for all time the particular result to be reached for par-
ticular problems whose latter-day ramifications they could not
have perceived. Instead, the better argument, in most circum-
stances, is that the Framers' deliberations rested on various broad
judgments and presuppositions that provide touchstones for lat-
ter-day constitutional decisionmaking 7
3. Structural interpretation is probably better established, and
more often used by courts, than is commonly recognized. Despite
its long history dating from at least 1803 in Marbury v.
Madison,"5 and despite its current resurgence in separation of
powers9 and state autonomy cases,100 the theoretical base and the
methodological problems of structural interpretation have not
been studied as often or as comprehensively as the other interpre-
tive approaches. The particular methodology of the structural ap-
proach has not been fully refined and articulated. Consequently,
the full potential of structural interpretation has yet to be
tapped.
Further study of this approach should be a priority for com-
mentators. We need to know more about techniques for drawing
inferences from constitutional structure, about the process of rea-
95. See, e.g., cases cited infra note 126; see also In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361-64
(1970) (holding that proof beyond a reasonable doubt is required during the adjudicatory
stage when a juvenile is charged with an act that would constitute a crime if committed by
an adult).
96. Such an approach to history would be akin to searching for a general rather than a
specific framer's intent; see supra text accompanying notes 52-53.
97. So understood, the historical approach would partially overlap the structural and
values approaches, and original history could yield evidence for use in applying these lat-
ter two approaches. See supra text accompanying notes 73-81; infra Part V(6).
98. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
99. See, e.g., INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683
(1974).
100. See, e.g., Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985); Na-
tional League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
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soning from inferences once they are drawn, about the levels of
abstraction at which inferences may appropriately be drawn,10
and about the role of structural inference in individual rights
cases.
102
4. The values approach holds the promise of playing the leading
role in the future development of constitutional law. It has be-
come and should remain the predominant approach for individual
rights questions, especially under the invitational clauses, and
also has potential applications to power questions. This approach
brings to center stage what should be in the spotlight: the critical
questions of values that are at the core of most constitutional is-
sues. Applying the values approach, the interpreter can focus
forthrightly on these questions, rather than clouding them with
speculations about specific Framers' intent'" or technical parsing
of less-than-enlightening reasoning from precedent. Such a direct
focus on value questions will also obligate the interpreter to jus-
tify the result reached in terms of competing values, 04 thus en-
couraging a more precise identification of these values and a
clearer demonstration of how the value being upheld is derived
from the Constitution (or, for a noninterpretivist, a clearer dem-
onstration of why the value should be upheld even if not derived
from the Constitution). To realize the potential of the values ap-
proach, we need to understand more about constitutional values.
We need to further investigate the values that are served by the
Constitution and its structures and processes.105 We need to iden-
tify these values more clearly, to better understand how they are
derived from the Constitution, and to better comprehend how
they have been developed over time and may further be refined
in the future. It is one thing, for example, to assert that "personal
privacy" is a constitutional value; it is quite another to identify
the particular aspects or zones of privacy that implicate constitu-
tional values, to demonstrate their emanation from the Constitu-
tion, and to critique their evolution over time. 0
101. See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text; supra note 72.
102. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
103. See supra text accompanying notes 52-53.
104. See infra Part VI(2).
105. See Lyons, supra note 44, at 751-56.
106. Consider, for example, the Supreme Court's performances in the line of privacy
cases beginning with Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481-86 (1965) (finding a zone
of marital privacy that encompasses the decision to use contraceptive devices in the
home), and continuing through Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564-66 (1969) (first
1008 [Vol. 42:983
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
In addition to such study of values, wc must progress toward a
resolution of the "interpretive"/"non-interpretive" debate' 7 if
the values approach is to reach its full potential. The dichotomy
that commentators have developed between interpretive and
noninterpretive approaches to value questions (or between consti-
tutional and "extra-constitutional" values) has sharpened per-
spectives on a central question of constitutional law. The light
cast by this debate, however, is revealing a large middle ground
where distinctions between interpretivism'and noninterpretivism
are not apparent and where the real issues concern how to inter-
pret the Constitution, not whether to do so.'
To claim this middle ground, one must affirm, as interpretivists
would, that values must be derived from the Constitution; extra-
constitutional values do not count. Any contrary conclusion'which
frees interpretation from its anchor in the Constitution would al-
low interpretation to drift in the currents of time and circum-
stance, thus undermining its stability and authoritativeness. At
the same time, one must affirm, as non-interpretivists would, that
constitutional values are not fixed for all time according to the
dimensions they may have had at the creation of the Constitution
or its amendments. As the Supreme Court has emphasized, the
provisions of the Constitution "are organic living institutions
[whose] significance is vital not formal [and] is to be gathered not
simply by taking the words and a dictionary, but by considering
their origin and the line of their growth."' 1 9 Thus constitutional
values may be developed and refined over time, as interpreters
encounter new circumstances and new knowledge not extant at
the time of the Constitution's framing."0 Through the experience
amendment protects the right to receive information and ideas, regardless of their worth,
and to be generally free from governmental intrusions into the privacy of one's thoughts),
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (protection of contraceptive use is not limited to
the marital relationship, but extends to the individual, married or single), Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113, 152-56 (1973) (right of privacy, from wherever founded, encompasses a wo-
man's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy), Paris Adult Theatre I v. Sla-
ton, 413 U.S. 49, 65-67 (1973) (the Stanley "zone of privacy" for private thoughts exists
only in the privacy of the home), and Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190-91 (1986)
(right of privacy does not extend to sexual conduct between consenting homosexuals, even
in the privacy of the home).
107. See supra notes 17, 65 and accompanying text.
108. See Grey, The Constitution as Scripture, 37 STAN. L. Rav. 1, 1-5 (1985); Simon,
supra note 17, at 619-20.
109. Gompers v. United States, 232 U.S. 604, 610 (1914) (Holmes, J.).
110. See generally Bennett, supra note 26, at 461-72.
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of such successive new encounters,111 and through the progress of
the human mind, 1 2 interpreters may better understand the
ramifications of constitutional values and discover their previ-
ously unexplored dimensions. 1 3 The anchor line tethering our
vessel of values may thus become encrusted with layers of life ex-
perience, becoming longer and stronger due to human progress,
but remaining solidly embedded in the Constitution.
Furthermore, for the values approach to realize its full poten-
tial, we must enhance our understanding of the levels of abstrac-
tion at which values may be stated. As with the historical and
structural approaches, attention to this problem of abstraction or
generalization is 'a key to effective use." 4 By their very nature,
values must be stated with some degree of abstraction. Values
capture fundamentals, not details, and translate into general
principles, not specific and narrow rules. The fundamentals cap-
tu'red by and principles derived from values should be sufficiently
general or abstract to maintain a timeless quality, providing guid-
ance over the long range of varying and yet-to-be-perceived con-
ditions.1 5 On the other hand, constitutional values' must be capa-
ble of concrete application to specific cases. Values cannot be
stated so abstractly that they lose their capacity to meaningfully
guide interpreters and constrain interpretive judgments. Using
privacy as an illustration, to state the constitutional value simply
as "personal privacy" Would be overly abstract; to state it as "pri-
111. Regarding judicial encounters, the Court has usefully described the process as one
of examining "the underlying principle .. in the crucible of litigation." Wallace v. Jaf-
free, 472 U.S. 38, 52 (1985).
112. In a related context, Thomas Jefferson argued
Llaws and institutions must go hand in hand with the progress of the human
mind. As that becomes more developed, more'enlightened, as new discoveries are
made, new truths disclosed, and manners and opinions change with the change
of circumstances, institutions must advance also, and keep pace with the times.
We might as well require a man to wear still the coat which fitted him when a
boy, as civilized society to remain ever under regimen of their barbarous
ancestors.
XV THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 40 (A. Lipscomb ed. 1903).
113. According to Justice Cardozo, "[sitatutes are designed to meet the fugitive exigen-
cies of the hour . . . . A constitution states or ought to state not rules for the passing
hour, but principles for an expanding future." B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL
PROCESS 83 (1921).
114. See supra note 72; notes 52-53 and accompanying text; text accompanying note
101.
115. Regarding the dangers of overly specific and narrow, or timebound, statements of




vacy of procreative choice,"'1 6 or "privacy of intimate personal as-
sociations,"' 7 or "privacy of the home,""11 8 though still abstract, is
much more meaningful.
5. Although the textual approach controls the other three ap-
proaches, no one of these other three-historical, structural, val-
ues-necessarily controls or has priority over the others. In prac-
tice, these approaches are often used in combination with each
other and with the textual approach. The historical approach will
be more pertinent in some cases than in others, depending on the
extent to which the current conditions at issue are analogous to
original historical practices or concerns and the extent to which
an historical record of these practices or concerns may be dis-
cerned. The structural approach will be more pertinent in some
cases than in others, depending on the extent to which the partic-
ular problem at issue implicates the interrelationships among ele-
ments of the constitutional structure. The values approach will be
more pertinent in some cases than in others, depending on the
extent to which the clause to be interpreted embodies broad value.
judgments-as the invitational clauses clearly do.
The numerical clauses such as those setting the minimum ages
for the President," 9 a Senator,120 and a Representative,' 2 ' because
of the specificity of their language, illustrate the predominance of
text and leave little room for other interpretive approaches. Other
clauses, such as the bill of attainder clauses,'22 ex post facto
clauses,'23  habeas corpus clause, 124  and self-incrimination
clause,' 12 5 whose language suggests technical meanings known to
the Framers, may be interpreted with considerable reliance on
history.2 6 For most power clauses, such as the commerce
116. See, e.g., Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 684-85 (1977).
117. See, e.g., Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617-22 (1984).
118. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 568 (1969), construed in Paris Adult Theatre
I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 66-67 (1973)..
119. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5.
120. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 3.
121. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2.
122. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3; art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
123. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3; art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
124. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
125. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
126. See United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 441-46 (1965) (bill of attainder clause);
Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 438-39 (1956) (self-incrimination clause); United
States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 320-25 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (interpretation
of technical clauses); P. BREST, supra note 5, at 114-18. The trend in the Supreme Court
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clause,127 structural considerations are particularly important due
to the federalism or separation of powers contexts in which fed-
eral power issues must be considered. For a rights clause with
open-textured language, such as the due process 128 and equal pro-
tection clauses, 12 9 the values approach may be predominant be-
cause the clause's language suggests but does not explicate a
value whose protection is the clause's mission. In general, then,
the applicability and force of particular interpretive approaches
will vary with the clause at issue and the problem to be ad-
dressed. The interpreter's task is to make use of whichever ap-
proach or approaches best illuminates the problem at hand.
6. Just as there is no predetermined pecking order among the
historical, structural, and values approaches, there are no crisp
boundary lines separating these three approaches from one an-
other or from the textual approach. The intent of the Framers,
for instance, may be gleaned not only from historical sources but
also from the clear implications of the text itself. Inferences to be
drawn from the Constitution's structure may be discoverable in
part from an exploration of history or from the political values
that underlie the structure. Values may be identified in large part
through evidence gleaned from text, history, and structure. Thus,
although one approach may prove more useful than the others in
a particular situation, interpreters should not apply the historical,
structural, or values approaches in isolation from one another,
any more than they should apply them in isolation from the text.
As one commentator has remarked, "[n]o sane judge or law pro-
fessor can be committed solely to one approach. Because there
are many facets to a single constitutional problem and . . . many
functions performed by a single opinion, the jurist or commenta-
tor uses different approaches as a ckrpenter uses different tools,
and often many tools, in a single project."130
7. There are no bright-line guides for applying any of the four
interpretive approaches that would shield interpreters from exer-
cising discretion or making value judgments. Despite the claims
has apparently been moving away from treating provisions as technical clauses with a
meaning largely fixed by history. See, e.g., Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970); United
States v. Brown, 381 U.S. at 447-49.
127. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
128. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV, § 1.
129. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
130. Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate, 58 TEx. L. REV. 695, 726 (1980).
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of some originalists, there is no approach capable of deciding a
range of real-life issues that can lay claim to complete objectivity
or value neutrality. Thus, the lure of achieving this goal provides
no basis for rejecting some approaches or embracing others. All
four approaches, given their limits, are subject to some charge of
subjectivity or indeterminacy; all will therefore engender some
controversy because all allow some room for judgment that, in an
imperfect world, may be subject to abuse.
Even the strict originalist who follows only the text and the
Framers' intent makes value judgments on several levels, all of
which may be influenced by the -personal values of the inter-
preter. Since neither the Constitution's text nor its original his-
tory tells us how to interpret the Constitution, the strict original-
ist's decision to use only text and history as interpretive sources is
the first act of judgment. Subsequently, the strict originalist en-
counters choices regarding the selection and weighing of historical
sources-which intellectual construct of collective intent to util-
ize, which account of the Framers' intent to apply, and whether
and how much to generalize from the specifics of text and his-
tory.1 31 All these choices require acts of judgment. Further, if
these choices dissuade the originalist from limiting government
power or recognizing rights, leaving these matters to the political
process, yet another judgment has been made-a judgment in
favor of majoritarianism over minority rights.132
8. We should not be uncomfortable or surprised that constitu-
tional interpretation inevitably involves continuous judgment, not
only concerning the interpretive approaches to apply to particular
issues but also concerning the competing values at stake in partic-
ular cases. As lawyers know from experience, and as legal philoso-
phers have argued, our law is characterized by degrees of uncer-
tainty and malleability. They have been prominent characteristics
of the common law. They have been characteristics of constitu-
tional law from the very beginning, as illustrated by the still-de-
bated Marbury v. Madison, which recognized judicial review of
congressional acts despite the absence of the practice in the con-
stitutional text establishing the courts' powers.13 3 In the real
131. See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 2, at 1209-17.
132. See generally Lyons, supra note 44, at 91-95. Regarding the Constitution's rejec-
tion of any clear preference for majoritarianism over minority right, see S. MACEDO, supra
note 44, at 21-31.
133. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
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world of constitutional practice, as in Chief Justice Marshall's
world, we search within the range of plausible meanings for the
one answer that best responds to the totality of insights from the
interpretive sources and other relevant considerations.1 4 Recog-
nizing that "law is the imperfect creation of imperfect human be-
ings . . .[and that] law is an art, not a science,"' 13 5 we seek what
is possible, coming as close to the ideal as we can but knowing we
will never reach it.
9. As the four primary approaches to interpretation are applied
over time, by courts and other official interpreters,3 6 precedents
are created. These precedents, especially those of the courts, be-
come the more concrete and more frequently utilized source of
law, and the lawyer's day-to-day tools of the trade. Since prece-
dent as a secondary interpretive source remains dependent on the
primary sources for its validity,'3 7 it also remains subject to over-
ruling if on reconsideration it is found to be unsupported by the
primary sources. When, however, these primary sources are used
according to the interpretive approaches set out above, the condi-
tions for overruling long-standing precedent, especially judicial
precedent, rarely exist in the real world.
Most arguments suggesting the invalidity of long-standing pre-
cedent are originalist assertions that a line of precedent conflicts
with a specific expressed intent of the Framers. If the role of orig-
inal history is limited and a more abstract concept of Framers'
intent is emphasized, as suggested above, many such originalist
arguments are undercut. Other bases for overruling precedent are
values arguments to the effect that a line of precedent is based on
some value not found in the Constitution. Under the values ap-
proach suggested above, 39 such arguments have force only in
clear and extreme cases. This is because the values ap-
proach-and the historical and structural approaches insofar as
they purport to identify values of the Framers or infer political
values from the constitutional structure-view interpretation as
an evolutionary process of enlightenment and refinement.1 40 In
134. See infra Part VI(2).
135. L. CAPLAN, THE TENTH JUSTICE 272-73 (1987) (citing Boorstein, The Perils of In-
dwelling Law, in THE RULE OF LAW 75 (R.P. Wolff ed. 1971)).
136. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
137. See supra Part III.
138. See supra Part V(2), (5), (6).
139. See supra Part V(4).
140. See supra text accompanying notes 109-13.
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such a process, each new precedent need not be grounded directly
and completely in the original primary sources in order to be
valid. It is sufficient if each new precedent is grounded in prior
precedent whose unbroken line reaches back to the primary
sources. Through this line of precedent, original constitutional
values are refined over time; the understanding thus gained may
support new precedents in ways not always clear from the original
value in its undeveloped state."" Like the branches of a tree,
which owe their life and character to their roots but are also sus-
tained by a trunk and limbs, precedents owe their authority to
their roots of primary sources but are also sustained by the trunk
and limbs of earlier precedents. Like the branches of a tree, which
develop and refine the tree far beyond its roots, precedents de-
velop and refine the Constitution far beyond its original primary
sources.'42
VI. IMPROVING THE PROCESS OF CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
The constitutional interpretation process, as this Article envi-
sions it, is the object of ongoing and escalating debate. Through
this debate, the theoretical foundations of constitutional interpre-
tation have expanded in breadth and complexity, and sometimes
uncertainty. Although this Article has made suggestions for ac-
commodation of competing viewpoints, and has sought to allevi-
ate complexity and uncertainty, the synthesis leaves some ques-
tions unresolved and answers to others incomplete. We are not
likely in the near future to achieve consensus on these remaining
questions. How, then, should we respond to this situation? What
can we do to capitalize on the constructive aspects of the de-
bate-to answer some of the legitimate criticisms of interpreta-
tion, to extract more of the potential from our constitutional sys-
tem, and to keep moving forward even amid disagreements
concerning the ideal to which we aspire?
The first task we can undertake is to search together for the
common ground in the debate and to seek reconciliation of con-
tending viewpoints whenever appropriate. Included in the tenta-
tive conclusions about constitutional interpretation were some
141. Cf. Bennett, supra note 26, at 474-85.
142. For an analysis of other considerations that may militate against the overruling of
long-standing judicial precedent, see Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudi-
cation, 88 COLuM. L. REV. 723 (1988).
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suggestions for accomplishing this task.14 3 Proceeding from that
base, further suggestions are set out below:
1. Although there is room for difference of opinion on interpre-
tive approaches and their applications to particular issues, we
should nevertheless recognize minimum criteria to which all con-
stitutional interpreters are held. Interpreters should have some
coherent theory or basic principles that provides a framework for
their interpretation, and that addresses matters of sources and
approaches. Interpreters should consistently apply their theory or
basic principles and should be open to reworking them on the ba-
sis of new insights. Adherence to these minimums will maintain
conditions conducive to continuing dialogue through which fur-
ther insights may be born.
2. There should be increased emphasis on the need for and pro-
cess of justification-the process by which constitutional inter-
preters justify the results that they reach in particular cases or
regarding particular problems. This process of justification re-
quires the interpreter to support his or her judgment by reference
to "[normative] criteria intrinsic to the processes of constitutional
decisionmaking." 1" "[T]he notion of justification, as opposed to
explanation, implies that the reasons supporting a decision be
'good' reasons, and this in turn requires norms or rules for deter-
mining what counts as a 'good' reason."""8 Thus, to justify a deci-
sion, the interpreter must account for the primary sources of in-
terpretation that he or she has utilized. The interpreter must also
account for the following: the application and force of precedent,
the factual circumstances concerning the parties, their dispute
and their contending interests, the broader "constitutional facts"
that illuminate the societal setting and give context to the dis-
pute,""8 any institutional considerations regarding the inter-
preter's role and competence within the constitutional system
that influence the interpretation, and the reasoning processes by
143. See supra Part V.
144. P. BREST, supra note 5, at 3; see also Cox, Foreword to The Supreme Court 1965
Term: Constitutional Adjudication and the Promotion of Human Rights, 80 HARV. L.
REV. 91, 98 (1966).
145. Fiss, Foreword to The Supreme Court 1978 Term: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV.
L. REV. 1, 13 (1979).
146. See, e.g., Pine, Speculation and Reality: The Role of Facts in Judicial Protection
of Fundamental Rights, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 655 (1988); Karst, Legislative Facts in Consti-
tuticnal Law, 1960 Sup. CT. REV. 75.
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which these pieces are woven together to achieve the result."' Re-
gardless of whether the interpreter is a court, such justification
should be set forth in a written opinion.
3. We should better describe and understand the external con-
straints on judges and other constitutional interpreters. The four
interpretive approaches above, when properly understood and
honored, are themselves constraints. The process of justification,
resulting in written opinions available for public scrutiny, is also a
constraint."' In addition, there are and must be other conven-
tions and official checks within our system-supportive of and
often accounted for within the justification process-that inhibit
interpreters from writing their own values into the Constitution
and that otherwise protect interpretation from being pervasively
subjective and ad hoc."' Examples of conventions include stare
decisis, '" case-by-case adjudication, the preference for disposing
of cases on nonconstitutional grounds,' 5' the presumption of con-
stitutionality and accompanying responsibility of measured defer-
ence to policy judgments of the political branches, and the meth-
ods of legal argument.' 52 The official checks are the checks and
balances arising from the federal constitutional system of sepa-
rated powers and the parallel state systems. To respond to criti-
ques that constitutional interpretation is too subjective, and espe-
cially that the values approach is too subjective, further study of
the roles and impact of such systemic conventions and checks is
needed.
4. We should more actively seek the assistance of disciplines
other than law in studying the theory and practice of constitu-
tional interpretation. Each of the four approaches to interpreta-
tion is ripe for further study by the professionals whose expertise
is most implicated. Linguists, philosophers of language, histori-
ans, political scientists, political philosophers, and moral philoso-
147. See N. MACCORMICK, LEGAL REASONING AND LEGAL THEORY (1978); Wechsler, supra
note 16, at 10-20.
148. See, e.g., Monaghan, Taking Supreme Court Opinions Seriously, 39 MD. L. REV. 1,
19-20, 24-25 (1979).
149. See generally Bennett, supra note 26; Fiss, supra note 4; Wechsler, The Courts
and the Constitution, 65 COLUM. L. REV, 1001 (1965).
150. See generally Schauer, supra note 21.
151. See, e.g., Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis,
J., concurring).




phers can all make important contributions. Historians, for in-
stance, can expand our understanding of the "background
assumptions" and "philosophical presuppositions' ' 13 that under-
lie the original Constitution, the Bill of Rights, and the post-Civil
War amendments. 5' The methods of legal reasoning in constitu-
tional cases could also be the object of further study by other dis-
ciplines; legal philosophers have performed that function for legal
interpretation generally, and could enhance our understanding by
further specific application of their insights to constitutional in-
terpretation. Moreover, we need to know more about the con-
straints on constitutional interpreters: what constrains them, to
what extent, and with what impact on the development of the
law. We also need to know more about how the answers to such
questions may differ depending on whether the intepreter is a
court, a legislature or legislative committee, or some other govern-,
ment agency or official. With respect to such matters, political
scientists, psychologists, sociologists, and anthropologists have
important contributions to make.
The following suggestions are a package, focused more directly
on the problem of value judgment in constitutional law. Insofar as
value judgments may present problems of subjectivity and anti-
majoritarianism, we should not respond by seeking to cleanse the
process of any capacity for value judgment; such a task is fruit-
less, for value judgment is an inevitable and desirable aspect of
constitutional law. We should instead respond by expanding and
strengthening the base from which value judgments are derived.
Suggestions 5 through 8 point in this direction.
5. We should seek to expand the precincts of the interpretation
process. Most official interpretation in our system, historically
and at present, is done by courts. 155 Most commentators on con-
stitutional interpretation focus on the work of the courts, yet-as
discussed above-the Constitution is directed to and binding
upon all branches of government, at federal, state and local levels,
not just the judiciary.
156
Thus all government officials and all government agencies
153. See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
154. For one promising new approach that may shed some light on these matters, see
Bloomfield, Constitutional Values and the Literature of the Early Republic, 11:4 J. AM.
CULTURE 53 (1988).
155. See supra note 9.
156. See supra Part If(A).
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should be constitutional interpreters insofar as their official du-
ties involve them in questions about the Constitution's meaning.
We should insist that they take responsibility for understanding
and adhering to the Constitution in their daily activities. In this
way, we can expand the range of viewpoints that enter the inter-
pretation process and bring the Constitution closer to the people
by bringing it closer to their representatives.
6. We should emphasize the importance of critically examining
the relevant qualifications of persons who are nominated for high-
level government offices, the duties of which include constitu-
tional interpretation. 157 The most,obvious example, of course, is
the appointment and election of judges-especially United States
Supreme Court Justices. While it may be inappropriate for the
President or the Senate to question Supreme Court candidates
concerning the substantive results they would reach in particular
cases, it is surely appropriate to question candidates on the pro-
cess by which they would reach such results. Moreover, because
value judgments are a central feature of constitutional interpreta-
tion,' 58 it is appropriate and necessary to ascertain the candi-
date's capacity for long-range vision-both backward and for-
ward-that sensitive value judgment requires.
Such questions and evaluations should also be an important fo-
cus for high-level judicial appointments throughout federal and
state court systems, as well as a background for dialogue on state
elections for high-level judgeships. Since interpretation is not the
exclusive province of the judiciary, similar considerations should
also play a role in the election and appointment of individuals to
high-level political and administrative offices whose responsibili-
ties may entail a substantial measure of constitutional
interpretation.
7. Regarding the courts in particular, we can seek to broaden
the perspectives that courts bring over time to interpretation.
Now as in the past, judges as a group are not a representative
cross-section of American society. Judges are more white, more
male, and more upper-class, than society in general.' 59 Thus, if
157. See generally id.; Biden, The Constitution, the Senate, and the Court, 24 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 951 (1989).
158. See supra Part V(4).
159. The Success of Women and Minorities in Achieving Judicial Office: The Selection




value judgments are influenced by the life experiences of inter-
preters, we should strive through appointive and electoral
processes to have judges as a group more nearly reflect the life
experience of all of American society.
8. We should seek to make constitutional law and the interpre-
tive process more accessible to those who are not experts-the
non-lawyers, the non-academicians, and citizens in general. The
Constitution emanates from and serves the People. In each gener-
ation, the citizens representing the People should contribute to an
ongoing public dialogue on the meaning of the Constitution.16
Each generation's perceptions, expressed through "interpretive
communities"'' or otherwise, and the "inner experience"' 62 of
each generation's citizens, should help shape our understanding
of public values. To facilitate this process, we must enhance both
the opportunities for public dialogue and the capacity of the Peo-
ple to participate effectively in it.'6'
The current debate on constitutional interpretation may not al-
ways serve these objectives. To the extent the debate takes place
on a highly theoretical level, it may be too esoteric to engage the
People; to the extent it is a debate among academic lawyers and
other academic experts, the circle may be too small to encompass
the People. We therefore need supplementary initiatives to
broaden the debate into genuine public dialogue. The suggestions
above point to some possibilities. Holding interpreters to the obli-
gation of the justification, available in written and publicly avail-
able opinions,"6 " would enhance the informational base for dia-
logue. Inviting a broader array of disciplines to contribute to the
debate165 would expand the circle. Extending the precincts of the
interpretive process beyond the courts 66 would bring the Consti-
tution closer to the People's representatives and thus closer to the
160. On the importance of public dialogue, see M. TUSHNET, supra note 1, at 317-18;
Minow, Interpreting Rights: An Essay for Robert Cover, 96 YALE L.J. 1860, 1861-62
(1987).
161. See supra notes 4 and 10.
162. See D. GRANFIELD, THE INNER EXPERIENCE OF LAW: A JURISPRUDENCE OF SUBJECTIV-
ITY (1988).
163. Assistance from other disciplines would also be helpful in pursuing this challenge.
See supra Part VI(4). Broadcast and print journalists, mass communications experts, edu-
cators, and political scientists, among others, could make contributions. See Some Recent
Studies of Political Learning, THE SPENCER FOUND. NEWSL., vol. 4, No. 2 (Aug. 1989).
164. See supra Part VI (2).
165. See supra Part VI (4).
166. See supra Part VI (5).
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People. Raising questions about constitutional interpretation and
constitutional values in the context of selecting judges and public
officials would both inform and engage the public while providing
a forum for expanded dialogue." 7
VII. CONCLUSION
We now ride astride a great resurgence of interest in the pro-
cess of constitutional interpretation. The debate has been exten-
sive and complex, the disagreements have been sharp, and the
uncertainties engendered by the debate have been uncomfortable.
Yet there is no need to be perplexed in the face of complexity, or
immobilized in the face of disagreement, or disheartened or skep-
tical in the face of uncertainty.
To counteract such tendencies, this Article has provided four
antidotes. In a style accessible to non-experts, it has developed a
synthesis and model by which the interpretive process may be
better understood. It has demonstrated that there is ample com-
mon ground upon which the interpretive process rests, thus pro-
viding a more focused perspective from which to view the dis-
agreements. It has related theory to practice by exploring the
actual work of the United States Supreme Court and the practical
ramifications of interpretive theory for both official and unofficial
interpreters. 8 Finally, it has set out some suggestions to guide
future development of the interpretive process.
No matter how far into the Constitution's future we project,
the interpretive process will not yield certainty of results or una-
nimity of viewpoint-nor should we wish it to do so. Nurtured
with the best lines of theory and the best patterns of practice, the
process will yield a workable constitutional system capable of
continuing incremental development. With enhanced understand-
ing of and respect for the process, and broadened participation in
it, we will progress toward fulfillment of the Constitution's
promise.
167. This may be the most valuable contribution and lesson of the Senate hearings on
President Reagan's nomination of Robert Bork to be an Associate Justice of the United
States Supreme Court. See S. Exec. Rep. No. 7, 100th Cong., Sess. 1 (1987).
168. See supra notes 4 and 10 and accompanying text.
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